The article challenges the first premise of "speculative realism ", according to which, with Kant, the 
Truth as Adequacy
In early-modern, pre-Kantian philosophy, there are two principal foundations of truth. According to the rationalists, empirical knowledge is uncertain due to sense deceptions, which is why clear and distinct ideas cannot be achieved externally, but only by way of rational argument. This a priori reduction in the content of the senses comes at a price: in order to secure the content to the cognition, which is thus secluded from the external world, the existence of innate ideas must be postulated in the end. The repudiation of this rationalist hypothesis later constitutes the opening act of the empiricist philosophy (Locke opens An Essay Concerning Human Understanding by stating that there are "no innate principles in the mind" (Locke 1825: 9) ) and consequently all knowledge now derives from definite, immediate perceptions. This, however, raises the issue of structures in the mind that enable the formation of compound, abstract, universal, intelligible ideas. The famous third step of this development is of course the Kantian turn, with its complex time/logic structure, which, according to the well-tried and now trivial definition, represents a synthesis of rationalism and empiricism. Kant's philosophy posits the existence of general operations of the mind that implement a synthetic supplement to the content of knowledge, and so being a common characteristic of all experience.
But why do we retell this well-known tale? Even though the proceedings of rationalists and empiricists are exactly the opposite, they are still bound by a common belief, a tacit assumption, that truth exists in the form of immediacy. Therein lies the reason why Descartes, in his celebrated opening act of modern thought, posits the doubt: a simple, immediate thing in the outside world must be doubted precisely because it could potentially sustain a truth deep enough to lay the foundation of the system of certainty. If the Cartesian subject, possibly by an act of epistemological mercy from a benevolent God, were absolutely certain of one of his sense perceptions, then the "truth of everything" could by all means be founded on this concrete sense perception, without the additional need to prove the incontestability of his own self-consciousness. Following merely the literal surface of Descartes' argument, one can see that at the beginning there is, in principle, no more truth to the ego than to the famous "this piece of paper" (Descartes 1996: 13 ) that Descartes holds in his hand in the room of his winter refuge in Neuburg an der Donau. Potentially, even a piece of paper could figure as the Archimedean point. The difference between the piece of paper and the ego is not ontological, but only epistemological: as a subject of knowledge I am only capable of being certain of myself, while due to the nature of my senses I cannot recognize the existence of a piece of paper clearly and distinctly. I cannot be sure of this piece of paper, but a piece of paper could at any rate be a place of truth. Even though Descartes was a dualist and his philosophy marks the beginning of a tradition, which subsequently gave rise to modern phenomena such as subjectivism, existentialism, individualism, solipsism, perspectivity of truth, etc., the argument itself does not, in its proceedings of reasoning and proving, explicitly write out any a priori ontological priority of the concept of the ego to the concept of any other thing. And it is precisely because everything is potentially equally "true", that the method of doubt, i.e., a procedure of sorting and picking immediacies one by one, is needed to distinguish the ego from all other facts and entities in the world.
Therefore, within Descartes' system a criterion of differentiation of facts that would sustain more or less truth is unthinkable. Everything, i.e., hands, feet, the fireplace, and this piece of paper, that have fallen victim to doubt, remain a guilty conscience in the memory of the subject of doubt and demand the same truth value as the ego possesses at the moment of self-certainty. To put it crudely, because every single thing aims at the same amount of certainty as the ego has it, God must finally be invented to guarantee the truth of the outside world. For this reason, Cartesian nature bears the immediate stamp of God and is, accordingly, no less true than the subject himself.
The fact that the ego, the bearer of all certainty and truth, and that piece of paper, the object of the ego's methodical doubt, are of the same ontological order, so to speak, is possibly the reason why, subsequently, the great tradition of modern rationalism resorted to argumentative structures that are as odd and unusual as Malebranchean occasionalism, Spinoza's parallelism of attributes of extension and thought, or Leibnizean monadology. In Malebranche, for instance, the prosthesis of God as an occasional cause is inserted into the pure immediate contact between mind and body, between spirit and matter, into each representation that the mind perceives and each movement that the body performs. In order to sustain the truth in the form of immediacy, every natural thing is now redoubled, having a physical existence outside the human mind and at the same time being an idea incepted to the mind by God. The Malebranchean ontology would rather endure a redundancy of this magnitude than deprive things of their ideal correlates, warrants of their immediate evidence, or, from the point of view of God, it is the ideas that cannot afford to be deprived of their real correlates. In Spinoza, the "order and connection of ideas is the same […] as the order and connection of things, and, vice versa, the order and connection of things is the same […] as the order and connection of ideas" (Spinoza 2002 : 365 (E V., P 1)) , and his unity of being, the conatus, is designed as a striving "to persevere in its being", that is to say, as an entity not beset with any inner negativity. Being is constructed exclusively within the framework of pure self-affirmation. And, finally, Leibniz's system is probably the most trenchant attempt to demonstrate how this piece of paper already stands in for an undiminished certainty and truth. Monads seem to be a symptom of Descartes' self-evidence, an extrapolation and generalization of the Cartesian form of truth: the absolute immediacy and punctuality of the self-certainty of the ego set the criteria of truth so high that now only the entities stand the trial of it, whose self-certainty is experienced within the absolute punctual immanence of their being. Truth can only be ascribed to the world that disintegrates and unitizes in a vast multiplicity of pure selfevidences. The fact of certainty is thus not restricted to the subject alone (in the sense of the Kantian condition of the possibility of all reality), but dissolves in innumerable cells and populates the entire universe -something that after the Kantian turn becomes obsolete, since now the ego, the "I think", is structurally detached from any possible phenomena.
Rationalism and empiricism advocated a truth in the form of common sense, of immediate evidence and adequacy. In the rationalist doctrine, only the immediacy that is a bearer of truth is recognized. As a consequence, God now stands at the beginning of every movement and every idea (Malebranche), the world is an assembly of positive conati as "modes of God" (Spinoza) , or, in a more pointed manner, is parceled out and secluded into monads (Leibniz). In an empiricist doctrine, on the other hand, only the truth that is a bearer of immediacy is recognized. Any entity that cannot become an object of immediate perception is now subtracted from the world, so at first primary qualities fade away (Berkeley), then substances, and finally even laws of causality (Hume). Similarly, empiricism develops ontological constructions unusual to the common sense, namely the Berkeleyean world extinguishing behind our backs and the Humean world without cause and effect. In the same way as with Descartes, there is no possibility to differentiate or even to hierarchize the "truth-value" of phenomena. If primary, and not only secondary, qualities could be perceived immediately, things would possess a substance, would be true and would continue to exist behind our backs. If cause and effect could be perceived immediately in the movement of bodies, the world would actually occur according to the laws of causality. What separates Hume's agnosticism from Kant's transcendentalism is the fact that "Hume's experiment", if there is one, strives to perceive the causal relation directly, thus presupposing that cause and effect either exist on the same ontological level as sensations, or that we remain, if we do not perceive them, eternally ignorant of their existence. To Hume, cause and effect do not form a transcendental level. Now, the question arises: why is it that a period of slightly more than a hundred years witnessed an emergence of systems of philosophy that, in the spirit of defending common sense, resort to such profoundly noncommonsensical constructions as, for instance, an erection authored by God himself (Malebranche), Julius Cesar, in whom his death by the hand of Brutus is already inscribed (Leibniz), a table that disappears when we avert our eyes from it (Berkeley), and billiard balls that only accidentally always move in expected directions (Hume)? Common sense, so it seems, tolerates even the most extreme non-commonsensical conceptions of the world, rather than renouncing its truth-form, whose place value is bound to the pure, immediate evidence.
Truth as Totalization
The early-modern, pre-Kantian philosophy apparently suffers from the condition of absolutization of this common-sense form of truth, the truth as an immediate adequacy of idea and thing. As a result of this rigid equation, "unintelligible" redundancies and reductions occur on both sides: on the side of the idea as well as on the side of the thing. Rationalism is, in a manner of speaking, afflicted by the problem of the contact between the idea and the thing, i.e., the problem of a real interaction. The classic example of this strict truth-invariance is Descartes' dualism, conceiving the relation between res cogitans and res extensa upon the model of the relation between two res extensae, as was already pointed out by Heidegger. The difficulties concerning the interaction between mind and body are a direct consequence of the simple fact that the mind is entitled to occupy reality in the form of immediacy, in the same way that the body does.
In this sense, rationalism subjects the idea to something that we might call the operation of acute verification. Since an idea can only be apprehended as immediate self-evidence, on the other side of this adequacy some kind of crystallization of the world of things takes place, condemning things to exist as sequestered immediate incarnations of ideas. In a way, the form of truth being strict adequacy, the order of ideas and the order of things become morcellated, parceled out and finally placed one on top of the other, so that, in Malebranche, each contact of a mental event as a cause with the physical event as an effect (or vice-versa) is an immediate explication of the idea within the time frame of a bare occasion, whereas in Leibniz, for instance, space and time are only an "order of coexistences" and an "order of successions", which makes them into a mere derivative background of the relations between bodies as the most direct embodiments of ideas. An idea is, so to speak, redoubled and thus acutely verified in the thing, most famously in the monad. The logical reduction is here performed on the side of reality, which thereby relinquishes its own autonomous, continuous, indiscreet causality, its non-ideal fluidity.
In contrast, the most authentic operation of empiricism is an acute verification of every 'reified' entity. The thing is perceived in its absolute immediacy, and it is translated to its ideal correlate so straightforwardly that a perception can no longer be apprehended outside the form of a pure sensual instantaneousness. Not unlike Muybridge's chronophotographs, reality is now "instantiated" or, to coin a new word, "momentised", and is incapable of egressing the form of its smallest un-intermediateness. In Berkeley, one cannot detect primary qualities behind the secondary ones, and there is no perseverance in being beyond the immediate intensiveness of perception, whereas in Hume, behind the momentary images of sense objects the principles that mediate between them can no longer be realized. It is now the thing that is acutely verified, being thoroughly and radically transformed into its most instant ideal correlate. Hence, the logical reduction is now performed on the side of the ideal entities. A world without substance, cause or effect appears before our eyes.
Leibniz's monad has neither windows nor doors, and in Malebranche no hand is moved without God being inserted between the mental and the physical event; in rationalism, the reality is parceled out. In empiricism no causal connection can be ascertained and no boundaries between things can be drawn; what remains are only windows and doors through which an uninterrupted current of phenomena is flowing, while this peripheral continuity refuses to be halted and allocated in a discreet, ideal entity; the reality is arguably infinitesimalized. On the side of rationalism, the idea is incapable of discharging and allowing the fluid of being, and on the side of empiricism, the fluid of being is unfit to fixate an idea. Because every single thing is consistently and invariably "true" in a manner so immediate and absolute, we are suddenly doomed to live in a thoroughly incomprehensible world. Common sense, thought through to the end, becomes something utterly nonsensical.
The philosophy of Kant may, in this respect, be regarded as an attempt to return to the normality of common sense. However, this return is possible not by conferring more truth on reality, but, in a way, by alleviating the truth-constraint from the immediacy of things. On the basis of the (not fully overlapping) differences between the noumenal and the phenomenal, the Apriori and the Aposteriori, the transcendental and the empirical, Kant succeeds in relieving the rationalist substances of a form of "acute" self-evidence and transfers them into the realm of "conditions of possibility", thereby releasing the phenomena from being the forthright embodiments of ideas. The ideas are no longer incarnated directly in reality, piecing it up in occasions, conati, or monads, but rather they, as "pure concepts", subsist in the latency of general forms of thought, by means of which the immediacy of experience is synthesized in the first place. On the other hand, cause and effect, space and time, the object-form and the logical continuity of the subject, all being general conditions of possibility, re-gain the certainty and the necessity that they forfeited in the time of empiricism. Reality is no longer verified within the temporality of a momentary sense impression, but seeks to establish a connection of phenomena and the mediation between them, thus transferring the truth-value to the form of the whole.
The "understanding" thus reclaims its former everyday sense of life. However, this shift of truth-value from immediacy to the conditions of possibility at the same ascribes the conditional to the unconditional, the absolute, thus unfolding the sphere of "reason". On account of this, the form of truth is no longer committed to "morcellate" the order of ideas and the order of things and to parcel, crystallize and infinitemalisize the contacts between the two orders, but rather it besets the form of adequacy with some sort of deferral towards totalization. The old forms of reality and truth, such as doubt, occasional cause, monad, secondary quality, and perception, are now substituted by a new form that is the "absolute totality in the synthesis of phenomena".
In Descartes, the system of certainty was still grounded on an immediate evidence of one of the facts (as mention earlier, this fact could potentially even be a piece of paper), whereas in Kant a particular phenomenon is unable to achieve the status of an a priori truth; seeing that the latter is reserved for the conditions of possibility. But within the Kantian universe, every phenomenon already asserts a claim to be constituted within the totality of phenomena, of which itself is only a part. "Thus the possibility of a thing is thoroughly determined only by the overall possibility of everything, and he who wants to know something in its entirety, must know everything." (Kant 1926 : 477-478 (Refl. 4244 (1789 -1779 ) Things are embedded in the context of other things, and the ideas or concept no longer assume the form of self-evidence. The "I", for example, is not a Cartesian self-certainty, but rather a form of subjectivity accompanying perceptions, thus a "condition of possibility"; the area of its verification is no longer punctual but ultimately requires the totality of self-affections of the inner sense, in order to fill out its conceptual form with content. Even the truth process itself is changed: sorting out, selecting, parceling, and infinitesimalizing of immediacies is replaced by mediations of syntheses, conditions and totalization.
Understanding is placed in the horizon of reason, and the truth-value is shifted from the realm of immediate evidence to the realm of the totality of conditions. Correspondingly, the form of the syllogisms, Vernunftschlüsse, "will contain the origin of special concepts a priori that we may call pure concepts of reason or transcendental ideas, and they will determine the use of the understanding according to principles in the whole of an entire experience.
[…] So the transcendental concept of reason is none other than that of the totality of conditions to a given conditioned thing." (Kant 1998 : 400 (KrV B 379)) Nonetheless, this semantics of reason, using the quantifiers such as "the whole", "entire", "universality", "allness", "totality", has a price to pay: in its final scope, the analytic of understanding is only completed as a transcendental dialectic, "that, fully a priori, is supposed to contain both the origin of certain cognitions from pure reason and inferred concepts, whose object cannot be given empirically at all, and so lies wholly outside the faculty of pure understanding." (Kant 1998: 405 (KrV B 390 )) The solidity of the representations of understanding is not grounded in the immediate evidence of ideas or perceptions, but rather in the embedding of understanding under the reason's horizon of totality; and yet, when it comes to the concepts of reason, the synthesis of intuition can no longer be completed, so the metaphysical concepts, and the judgments that are being made on them, remain mere paralogisms, antinomies and an ideal.
To put it pointedly, Descartes rounded out the potential deceptiveness and inconstancy of sense objects within the realm of the certainty of the 7 Here, a paradigm shift away from Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz comes most clearly into focus. In Leibniz, to take only the most striking example, the monad represents the entire universe and could deduce it from within. In Kant, however, the thing can only "represent" an idea, if it previously forms an "allnes" with all other things, so, in a way, it is now the universe that represents a single thing rather than vice versa. While in Leibniz, a single monad suffices, to deduce from it the entire universe, in Kant, the whole universe is needed from which a single thing is to be deduced. 8 Hereinafter abreviated as "KrV", page numbers refer to the original pagination.
Ego and then within the proof of the existence of God, while with Kant, in contrast, the solidity of the syntheses of understanding finally dissolves into the illusions of the judgments of reason. In Descartes, the doubt about this or that thing is comforted in the secure lap of God; in Kant, however, the firm ground of things of understanding liquidates in the hazy mist of the idea, in uncertainty, whether God exists or not. The "soul", the "world", and "God", are never to become an object of experience and remain empty; through an inner sense an immediate self-knowledge of the I as an empirical intuition is impossible, the empirical knowledge of the world as a whole cannot be synthesized, and one is incapable of immediately perceiving God by ways of understanding. The dialectical undecidability of metaphysics is the price to be paid, since the truth is no longer, as with Descartes, structured as an Archimedean point from which the universe could be unhinged, but rather a new quantifier of truth is deployed, the universal quantifier of "allness", that is, of the "absolute totality in the synthesis of phenomena".
In a way, between Descartes and Kant certainties and uncertainties change places. This shift of the truth-value can probably best be examined on the basis of the distribution of affirmations and negations in rationalism, as opposed to Kantianism. Since, in Descartes, the truth is conceived upon the form of immediate adequacy, since finite things are potential bearers of truth, at the sight of the dressing gown, the stove, or the piece of paper, the question must be posed, whether they exist or not. "How do I know", Descartes asks himself, "that he [God] has not brought it about that there is no earth, no sky, no extended thing, no shape, no size, no place?" (Descartes 1996: 14 (Emphasis added.) ) And the verification procedure arrives at its end, when a discursive realm of resistance to a possible negation is achieved: "and let him [God] deceive me as much as he can, he will never bring it about that I am nothing so long as I think I am something." (Descartes 1996 : 17 (Emphasis added.)) Throughout the entire rationalism, affirmation and negation are equivalent in the sphere of the finite, while in the sphere of the infinite the affirmation altogether prevails. In this vein, Spinoza claims that "to be finite is in part a negation and to be infinite is the unqualified affirmation of the existence of some nature" (Spinoza 2002 : 219 (E I., P8, Note I.)), so that: "from the order of Nature it is equally possible that a certain man exists or does not exist" (Spinoza 2002 : 244 (E II., A I.)), while the substance, on the other hand, is conceived as an exclusion of possible negation: "its essence necessarily involves existence; that is, existence belongs to its nature" (Spinoza 2002: 219 (E I., P7)). It is now Kant that reverses this distribution. While within the domain of understanding, of synthesizing concrete experience, the form of affirmation prevails and negation remains only its marginal, "ridiculous", didactic supplement (see : Kant 1998: 628 (KrV B 737) ), the differentia specifica of the judgments of reason, that is, of paralogisms, antinomies, and of the ideal, is exactly the circumstance that they are so to speak constructed according to rule of the co-sovereignty of affirmation and negation. The most splendid example of the co-existence of affirmation and negation are certainly the antinomies, and even the book layout conforms to this equivalence. As far as we know, the case of the affirmative judgment being printed on the left-hand side of the book and the negative on the right-hand side finds no parallels in the pre-Kantian philosophy; one could say that this novelty of Kant is a peculiarity of almost aesthetic delight. Furthermore, in his critique of the ontological proof of the existence of God, Kant says: "Now if I think of a being as the highest reality (without defect), the question still remains as to whether it exists or not" (Kant 1998: 568 (KrV B 628) ), claiming practically the same thing that Spinoza did about the finite human creature. The phrases that Descartes and Spinoza apply to the objects of doubt, the finite modes, and the human being, are to be found in Kant, in a nearly identical form, on the other side of the order of magnitude: with God.
Descartes' system of doubt and certainty, Spinoza's system of negation and reality (and finally even Leibniz' system of metaphysical evil and highest good) undergo significant displacements in Kant's philosophy. For this reason, the methodologies of rationalism and empiricism suddenly become obsolete. Cartesian doubt, as a method of the successive reduction of uncertain facts, forfeits its relevance, and it is not because with Kant the phenomena would attain some additional certainty, but because the noumena shifted to another domain no longer verified through immediate evidence. This is the crux of the matter: the issue is not that within the Kantian world this piece of paper, this winter dressing gown, this fire, could never become an object of deception, but rather that the truth form is now "invested" in a different sphere, so the system no longer needs to assume and presume that immediate outer things invariably hover over the abyss of non-existence. The concepts of falsehood, 9 "From the fact that the existence of outer objects is required for the possibility of a determinate consciousness of our self it does not follow that every intuitive representation of outer things includes at the same time their existence, for that may well be the mere effect of the imagination (in dreams as well as in delusions); but this is possible merely through the reproduction of previous outer perceptions, which, as has been shown, are possible only through the actuality of outer objects." (Kant 1998: 328 (KrV B 278)) doubt, and prejudice, no longer represent an entrance test for admission to the system of certainty. "The senses do not deceive", Kant says, "(…) not because they always judge correctly, but rather because they do not judge at all." (Kant 2007: 258) In the Kantian world, optical illusions do not cease to exist, they only forfeit the function of a truth criterion. Because the truth is now in a way upgraded, the sense perceptions of the lower level need not be scrutinized as assiduously as before. Therefore, the senses stop lying as notoriously as they did in the times of Descartes, and, subsequently, optical illusions, hallucinations, and severed limbs do not represent the touchstones of philosophical arguments any more.
In short, the problem of illusion and the threat of non-being appears only where the truth-value is, so to speak, "invested" or "saturated". With Descartes, the method first aims at the immediate thing in the form of adequacy (or correspondence), so that the name of this method can only be doubt, i.e., the dilemma about whether this thing exists or not. With Kant, on the other hand, the truth is conceived in the form of conditions of possibility, of the unconditional, the absolute, or the totality. Therefore, it is the realm of reason, the transcendental dialectic, that is affected by nothingness. The entities whose existence become precarious are now the I, the world, and God.
In this sense, the transfer of the truth-value from the form of adequacy to the form of totalization already functions as a latent operation of releasing, the operation which in its definite form will not be performed until Hegel. The facticity, once corroded by doubt, negation, evil, immateriality, and lack of necessity, now seems to be able to exist solidly and at ease. Figuratively speaking, Kant brought back to us the "taken-for-grantedness" of Descartes' winter dressing gown and fireplace beyond the necessity to doubt their existence, Malebranche's movement of the hand without the need to insert in it the occasional cause, Leibniz' monads whose doors 10 The same argument of a Cartesian dream being transmitted to the realm of Kantian totality was beautifully phrased by Schopenhauer: "Thus individual dreams are distinct from real life in that they do not mesh with the sequence of experiences that always runs through real life (waking marks this difference). But real life has this inter-connection of experiences because inter-connection is a form of experience; and in the same way, dreams also manifest inter-connection within themselves. But if we now adopt the point of view of a judge standing outside of both, then there is no definitive way to distinguish between them, and we must concede to the poets that life is an extended dream." (Schopenhauer, 2010: 39-40 .) The clear and distinct dividing line between a short dream and real life is secured from the perspective of the "life as a whole", but, as if by way of compensation, this "whole of life" must finally become but a long dream. And in Kant the distinction between a minor trick of the senses and reality can only be guaranteed in a world that is itself possibly an illusion.
and windows finally open, Berkeley's table that vanishes no more when we avert our eyes from it, and the causal interaction of Hume's substances in space and time that are no longer subject to radical contingency. Within the domain of understanding, the former truth-coordinates, such as Descartes' dualism, Malebranche's occasionalism, Leibniz' pre-established harmony, Berkeley's immaterialism, and Hume's agnosticism, become antiquated. However, this repression of negation in the domain of understanding witnesses a "return of the repressed" in the domain of reason. The undecidability of being and non-being, which was cultivated by preKantian philosophers in the scope of minor and partial phenomena, such as my hands and feet, mental and physical events, determination and negation, Brutus and Caesar, the table behind one's back or the collision of billiard balls, overleaps with Kant to the level of "everything". Rationalist and empiricist alternatives of being and nothing start eroding the totality itself. They seize hold of the "soul", the "world", and "God", as well as other ideals of the other two Critiques.
Kant thus offers a world that is partim more "real" and more "commonsensical" than the rationalist or empiricist universe, yet in toto this same world becomes undecidable as to the alternative of truth and falsehood. We can be certain of our hands and feet, a rose can stab us in the back, and all pragmatic assumptions in a game of billiards are ontologically justified, but we are not in a position to be sure whether the world as a whole really existed. On the level of totality, the question, why is there being instead of nothing, seems to be slightly out of place, and it only remains for us to ask: Are we really confident that there is being instead of nothing? Kant himself wrote in the Critique of Judgement: "Perhaps nothing more sublime has ever been said, or any thought more sublimely expressed, than in the inscription over the temple of Isis (Mother Nature). 'I am all that is, that was, and that will be, and my veil no mortal has removed.'" (Kant 2000: 194 (KU 316) ) Isis is "all that is, that was, and that will be", and the reason why no one ever took a glance behind her curtain may well lie in the fact that being itself, at the very moment it is bestowed with a universal quantifier, turns into a mere veil.
Truth as Release. Gleichgültigkeit, Hegel's Overlooked Revolution
In the first two chapters, a criterion, a distinction, has been introduced between the truth conceived upon the form of Cartesian doubt and the truth constructed upon the form of Kantian conditions of possibility.
One could speak of two different ontologies -with all its "ontological" consequences. On the one hand the ontology of immediacy (which is in the end compelled to presuppose the existence of God); on the other, the ontology of totalization (which remains an infinite task). And now the possibility of a third ontology may be considered, i.e., the ontology of release and de-totalization. Its traces go back at least as far as Hegel. After the truth of understanding and the truth of reason, a third kind of a truth form was invented, the truth of spirit, Hegel's Geist. As we shall see, this entirely new form of verification performs two operations simultaneously: it finally fills out Kant's empty metaphysical ideas, and it releases the immediacy from their jurisdiction. Here, both Cartesian doubt and Kantian infinite empirical syntheses become obsolete. And this could precisely be the point, from where a re-reading of Hegel's Sense certainty can take off.
The only reason why "sense certainty" is placed at the beginning of Phenomenology of Spirit, a work representing the first part of System of Science, lies in an attempt to expose the truth to the test of immediacy. For it says: "this is the essential point for sense-knowledge, and this pure being, or this simple immediacy, constitutes its truth." (Hegel 1977: 58-59) The tool that language disposes of to pin down immediacy is a demonstrative pronoun (similar to Descartes asking himself whether this piece of paper existed), and so the world now divides into "one 'This' as 'I' , and the other 'This' as object." (Hegel 1977: 59) To the question: "What is Now?", let us answer, e.g. "Now is Night." In order to test the truth of this sense-certainty a simple experiment will suffice. We write down this truth; a truth cannot lose anything by being written down, any more than it can lose anything through our preserving it. If now, this noon, we look again at the written truth we shall have to say that it has become stale.
The Now that is Night is preserved, i.e. it is treated as what it professes to be, as something that is; but it proves itself to be, on the contrary, something that is not. The Now does indeed preserve itself, but as something that is not Night; equally, it preserves itself in the face of the Day that it now is, as something that also is not Day, in other words, as a negative in general. This self-preserving Now is, therefore, not immediate but mediated; for it is determined as a permanent and self-preserving Now through the fact that something else, viz. Day and Night, is not. (Hegel 1977: 60) In Descartes, this piece of paper is an object of doubt, its victim; in Hegel, however, the paper becomes a means of his method: as a place of preservation of the written, it assumes the role of the Archimedean point investing the world with a new value. Here, it is the I that is uncertain of himself, while the piece of paper is able, as it were, to say: "It is written, therefore it is", thus becoming a bearer of some sort of self-evidence, of certainty that, irrespective of the changes in the immediacy, one and the same statement can always be read from it. Hence, the simple contraposition of the I and the world is now transferred into a new dialectic, which no longer perpetuates the naive opposition of outside and inside, but rather opens a new front between the written sentence and the referred fact already beginning to elude adequacy.
In a way, Hegel here implements Berkeley's method of "turning one's back". However, the subject now actively turning away is the world of day and night, while the truth of the I, pinned down to the temporal adverb "now", has, as Hegel points out, already become stale. It is the I that, so to speak, extinguishes behind the back of the world. Nevertheless, the Hegelian subject is, at this point, no longer confined to being a mere "I" of sense-knowledge, a tabula rasa of a sort, but rather he already embodies a certain schism between the I and the piece of paper, that is, he disposes of a leverage point from which the truth becomes increasingly less dependent on the outside:
As so determined, it is still just as simply Now as before, and in this simplicity is indifferent to what happens in it; just as little as Night and Day are its being, just as much also is it Day and Night; it is not in the least affected by this its other-being. A simple thing of this kind which is through negation, which is neither This nor That, a not-This, and is with equal indifference This as well as That -such a thing we call a universal. So it is in fact the universal that is the true [content] of sense-certainty. (Hegel 1977: 60) At this point, the subject of knowledge assumes a new function, the importance of which should not be underestimated: he is given the right to become indifferent, gleichgültig, to night and day. Generally, one imagines the empiricist subject to incarnate intensity and constancy of his presence of mind, a continuity of perceptions. Berkeley's subject may avert the eyes, but he is not allowed to hide behind indifference, since his perception immediately produces the being of things. Hume's subject is a bundle of perceptions, and if he were indifferent to his immediate impressions, he would not exist at all. Even Kant treats the subject of Ich denke as a continuous accompaniment of his representations. Of all these subjects it could be said that they are the being of night and day, and without them there is neither night nor day. Hegel, on the other hand, invents a new realm, in which the subject is finally permitted to become indifferent to his immediate cognition. However, in order to open the "logical space" for this indifference to emerge, he must first endow the subject with a certain surplus, with which his indifference is kept in balance; as Hegel famously states: "But language, as we see, is the more truthful". (Hegel 1977: 60) The indifference, thus, does not come free of charge; it is counter balanced by the fact that at the place of the subject a truth-surplus is produced, the "greater truthfulness" of language. Namely, the "now", the signifier of the subject-position, is at the same time a universal concept of language, and as such it becomes truer than its mere correspondence to either day or night. Night and day are not its being, Hegel says; in the face of the universal of language, an immediate certainty, an empirical adequacy, does not guarantee truth as yet. But Hegel does not stop here; he also adds, just as much also is it Day and Night. And the second half of this sentence is of even greater importance, representing the necessary correlate to the Hegelian turn. The "now" is a point of coincidence of two subjects, the subject of the judgment (that is, the grammatical subject) and the deictic function, through which the subject of perception is inscribed into language. And since the subject of perception, signified by the "now", produces a linguistic surplus value whose truth no longer derives from the (empirical) immediacy of the world, on the reverse side of this shift the world likewise gains an independence from the attention of the subject of knowledge. Night and day acquire an ontological license to change in their own right, according to a mechanics that does not adhere to the logic of cognition, certainty, and truth, and, consequently, the alternation of day and night makes no further claims on the subject, in whose eyes it would come to exist. In a sense, the world now relinquishes the need to be gazed upon by God, whose fleeting, "dialectical" existence was still presupposed by Kant. This, at first glance, inconspicuous shift may very well be a significant achievement of far-reaching consequence. Since Hegel is never weary of repeating the term, the Gleichgültigkeit, indifference, seems to play an essential role in this cognitive situation. The subject is relieved of the task to constantly perceive, cognize, constitute the objects, etc., but, symmetrically, the outer world, the cycle of day and night, gains independence from the cognitive activity of the subject. The reverse side of this new attitude toward the world is an unimpeded, continued existence of the external world. And in view of our naive notions about the nature of truth and philosophy that we have grown accustomed to under Cartesian influence, this may represent a certain revolution. If the subject is entitled to become indifferent to his outside, then the world is free to lose its meaning; it is allowed to exist behind our backs, and it need not be totalized into a transcendental idea. Indeed, immediacy no longer plays the role of the bearer of truth, neither in the form of adequacy nor in the form of totalization. Even if this thing in front of us is exceedingly certain, we haven't thereby achieved truth as yet. And even if we sum up and resume all the things and facts of the world, we are still not capable of conceiving of the concept of the "world". Or, seen from the other perspective: the moment the outer world slips out of the focus of truth, it no longer needs to disappear and become null and void. There is no necessity for the things of the world to become an object of Cartesian doubt, Berkeley's turning of the back, Hume's agnosticism, or, in the perspective of totality, of Kant's logic of illusion. Here, Hegel almost argues for some sort of unconscious anti-Berkeleyianism: in Berkeley, when one averts his eyes from the thing, the thing vanishes, while in Hegel, one quasi must face away to release the thing in the facticity, to enable its emergence as a purely factual existence outside the framework of the subject of knowledge. The tables fade behind our backs as symbols and meanings, so to speak, and only behind our backs do they re-surface as facts. Now, the following thesis can be proposed. Hegel's Gleichgültigkeit is not an accidental disposition of the subject of knowledge, but rather a method, la méthode, which is as strict, relevant, and far-reaching as Cartesian doubt. Gleichgültigkeit is a foundation of a new ontology that may contain and implicate some of the most important precursors of modern thought.
Correctness and Truth
To this day, our thinking is somewhat spontaneously governed by the idea that Cartesian doubt represents a paradigm of the beginning of philosophy, a philosophical opening gesture par excellence. In our instinctive, immature minds, we still believe that the first and most fundamental philosophical question is whether the outer world exists or not. So it seems that doubt itself cannot be doubted. It may be that previously we led a fairly comfortable and efficient practical life, but once we enter the domain of philosophy, we are filled with a pretentiousness of a sort, so that even the most rudimentary objects of use are suddenly beset with an aura of untruthfulness and falsity. The instantaneous philosophemes start sounding like platitudes: "Everything is an illusion", "Nothing is what it seems", or "The truth does not exist".
Even though (Cartesian) doubt represents some kind of "rite of passage" to the path of truth, in itself, like any method, it combines a number of prejudices and presumptions. It tacitly implies, firstly, that clear and distinct representations are a full truth by themselves; secondly, that the I assumes a preliminary, isolated, extramundane position from where the world can be subjected to doubt in the first place; thirdly, that the outer world is a primary object of seeking truth; fourthly, that the boundary between the I and the outer world is previously defined, and so on. For instance, if one finds the things perceived to be false, than one presupposes at least one truth: that one knows where exactly the boundary is to be drawn between the otherwise potentially true, yet structurally inaccessible, outer reality and the subject of knowledge equipped with imperfect, unreliable, and deceptive senses.
Nevertheless, we can now imagine a different approach to the outer reality by posing the following alternative: to believe that the outside world exists and is approximately the same as the senses reproduce it, is admittedly pretentious, since an irrefutable proof for it is missing; yet to believe that the outside world is different from what the senses reproduce, that it is in fact false, is even more pretentious, since this alleged falsity of the outside world, first, by default assumes that we are in full possession of a truth criterion that could disqualify the content of sense perceptions, second, it automatically ascribes to the outside world a distinctive, unattainable existence that is a bearer of a truth-value, and, finally, it also presumes that we know exactly where to draw the line between the outside and the inside that the truth is then incapable of trespassing. In this new alternative, the truth is not decided by comparing the reality of the outside world and the content of our inner representations of it, but by weighing the two pretentiousnesses and deciding that the one is more pretentious than the other. That is, it is an act of choosing between the presupposition that the world can never be known adequately and the presupposition that we don't have any discriminative criterion at our disposal, according to which the ego and the world should a priori be unattainable to each other.
One of the principal arguments of Heidegger's Being and Time proceeds precisely from this new relation of the I and the outer world, a relation expressed in terms of Dasein's concern, Besorgen (or, in a broader sense, care, Sorge) and the "tool-character" of things, all of which stands for the fall of the modern boundary between inside and outside, thus making the Cartesian prejudice of doubting the external world and requiring the ontological proof of its existence obsolete. "The 'scandal of philosophy'", Heidegger claims, "is not that this proof has yet to be given, but that such proofs are expected and attempted again and again." (Heidegger 1962: 249) If the primary relation to the world was once expressed by the "theoretical" categories of representation, perception, induction, abstraction, etc., it can now be conceived through life-world concepts such as "average everydayness", "ready-to-handedness", "proximally and for the most part", etc. And Heidegger's "method", if there is one, is nothing if not an attempt to choose the least presumptuous stance from the selection of many (the Kantian, Leibnizean, Berkeleyean, Humean, the scientific, inductive, experimental, quantifiable). Heidegger's "practization" of the theoretical world, his normalization of objectivity, does not have the function of a "direct proof of the existence of the world", but can only be defined as a choice of a lesser pretentiousness. It is therefore not the case that Heidegger's world was in any way truer than that of Descartes, the point is rather that the Cartesian method is more presumptuous; which is precisely the pivotal point of the argument.
For this reason, we do not imply that with Hegel's Gleichgültigkeit, according to which "just as much also is it Day and Night", and with Heidegger's everydayness, which denies the need for the proof of existence of the world, the naïve realism once more assumed the function of a truth criterion. On the contrary, in this perspective it is not the belief in the existence of an independent outside reality (hence, naïve realism) that is naïve, but rather it is the stance that has now become naïve, whereupon the front between the object and the subject, the question of correspondence between reality and representation, is by itself already a focal point of truth. Or, to put it in another way, when the truth form was still determined by (naïve) realism, one was in incessant need of doubting one's representations; however, the moment the (naïve) realism no longer lays the foundations of the truth-value, the world regains its former "normal" reality, albeit at a price: the reality as such may now be real, but it is in itself also something utterly naïve. For in Hegel's phrase "just as much also is it Day and Night", day and night exist as facts and are exactly as they seem, but do not therewith possess truth as yet.
Le us briefly return to the sense certainty. We wrote down the sentence "Now it is Night" on the piece of paper, meanwhile it has become bright, and we find that it is now day. But the sentence on the piece of paper persists. At the empirical level it became untrue, but at the same time it produced its own irrevocable "truth", a permanence of a sentence, in the face of which the immediate outside world, a former warrant of truth, proves untrue. There is therefore a sentence "Now it is Night", and there is a reality that, by refuting the sentence, it is itself refuted. This new formulation of truth-value will later be terminologically specified by Hegel as the difference between correctness and truth, Richtigkeit and Wahrheit.
Hegel's correctness is constituted on the line between representations and outer things and is the truth about the empirical facts of the world. The truth, however, is the truth of the explicated concept. The concept is thus no longer a form of representation, of empirical adequacy, of Kantian synthesis of experience, but rather a form of discourse. "Night" and "day", being the empirical determinants of the "now", are sometimes correct and at other times incorrect, but the truth has already passed over from the realm of facts to the realm of the universality of language.
Compared to the early-modern philosophy and Galilean science, the most scandalous point to this new form of truth is the case that a statement, even though it is perfectly correct, is thereby not yet true. Now, what does this new "truth" consist of, what is its surplus over the mere correctness? Let us imagine that besides the sentence "Now it is night" we write down on the piece of paper the sentence "Now it is day". From both statements a law of discourse can be deduced, by which the (grammatical) subject is henceforth constituted within the symmetrical opposition between its two predicates (namely, the "now" within the opposition between "day" and "night"), and the subject is now allowed to become indifferent to the course of the outer world. The concept "now" is determined within the discourse as an interplay between the concepts "day" and "night", and henceforth it doesn't have to consider the present state of the world to verify its content.
It is a seemingly paradoxical situation. Modern science operates within the paradigm of the truth as the induction of empirical data from the outer world, the truth of immediacy, and yet it is precisely the Cartesian method that according to Heidegger "has the tendency to bury the 'external world' in nullity 'epistemologically'" (Heidegger 1962: 250) . With Hegel, 12 The difference between Wahrheit and Richtigkeit is to be found in the famous passage of the Small Logic: "The idea is the truth; for the truth is this, that objectivity corresponds to the concept, not that external things correspond to my representations; these are only correct representations that I, this person [lch Dieser], have. In the idea it is not a matter of an indexical this [Diesen] , it is a matter neither of representations nor of external things. But everything actual, insofar as it is something true, is also the idea and possesses its truth only through and in virtue of the idea." (Hegel 2010: 283 ( § 213)) however, the truth-value is transferred from the realm of representations to the realm of ideas, and, yet, it is this new truth that now becomes indifferent to (or even "at ease" with) the entire area of correctness, therewith allowing the realism to exist in its own right. The "philosophical" standpoint is no longer constituted by a suspension of the realist stance, but by reaching a point of indifference to it. The important thing is: as soon as the meaning of a concept (as in our case "now", "day", and "night") is discursively determined, beyond this the Cartesian doubt and the Kantian totality are no longer required; the birds are singing, the grass is growing, night and day are changing, and there is no longer any need to apply to them the operation of reduction or totalization. Once we begin laying claims to something truer than the mere immediate experience, the criteria for assessing this very experience retroactively unwind and get released. In the methodological sense, Hegel's system offers the possibility of a two-fold evaluation of "truth", now being either richtig or wahr. And since for Hegel the external, empirical reality of the natural consciousness is unwahr, untrue, there is no need to deprive it of its correctness as well, its immediate reality, its factuality (in opposition to actuality, Hegel's Wirklichkeit, which is structured by reason and therefore always already wahr).
Conclusion
The immodest program of today's fashionable realisms was to return to pre-Kantian philosophy, to Locke's primary substances and Descartes' material substance, as if there was more realism in the time before Kant. In opposition to it, we pointed out a side to Kantian philosophy that is completely faded out by speculative relists. Kant constructed a philosophy that would secure the normal and necessary existence of the world behind our backs. In a way, he philosophically warranted a world that does not have to be perpetually verified and can, hence, exist devoid of God's ideas and outside the intensive constancy of the human gaze. Kant's transcendental subjectivism procured us with the common-sense normality of the world, but it was only Hegel's absolute subjectivism that granted us the first glimpses into the radical meaninglesness of the facticity. Kant gave us the solidity of things not gazed upon, so to speak, while it was not until Hegel's logic of indifference that an egress of the circle of Kant's totalization was made possible. This releasing the facticity, however, is not to be obtained straightforwardly, but only by way of evermore-complex equilibria. Hegel had to "intensify" his idealism and start producing ideal entities in self-reflexive circuits in order to be able to open new dimensions of realism.
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